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Closing Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)’s Loopholes: Why Criminal  
Defendants Are Entitled to D scovery of All of Th ir Statements
I. OVERVIEW
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”1 Often, the most formidable witnesses that criminal defendants may face at trial are themselves. 
The government may be expected to present, as evidence, all 
confessions, incriminating statements, and damaging stray 
remarks allegedly made by the defendant in preparation 
for a crime, in its commission, in its concealment, and in its 
investigation. Yet, in federal court, a criminal defendant’s right 
to pre-trial disclosure of his or her own statements is severely 
constrained. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a) (“Rule 
16(a)”) is laden with loopholes, and thus the court must un-
dertake a complex inquiry with 
regard to each such statement to 
determine whether the prosecu-
tion bears a duty to disclose it. 
Too often, the conclusion is that 
no such duty exists.
Unlike many state court 
discovery rules,2 Rule 16(a) 
requires the government to dis-
close only certain types of the 
accused’s own statements, and 
then only upon the accused’s 
request.3 A criminal defendant 
is not entitled to disclosure of 
three broad categories of his or 
her own statements.4 First, a defendant is not entitled to his or 
her statements made to third parties, unless they were written 
or recorded.5 Second, a defendant is not entitled to his or her 
oral statements unless, at the time of making the statement, the 
defendant: (a) knew he or she was speaking to a government 
agent and (b) made the statements in response to interrogation.6 
Third, a defendant is not entitled to his or her oral, written, 
or recorded statements made to state agents prior to the com-
mencement of a federal investigation or prosecution.7 Even if 
the government is aware of these statements long before trial, 
and even if disclosure compromises no aspect of the prosecu-
tion, Rule 16 does not require disclosure to the accused.
If criminal defendants have a constitutional right to 
confront the witnesses against them, shouldn’t this right 
extend to their own incriminating statements? If the prosecution 
is aware of a defendant’s damaging statements in advance of 
trial, what values are protected by non-disclosure other than the 
element of surprise? The statements are not the prosecutor’s or 
government agent’s work product, and they are not privileged. 
Unquestionably, the statements are not only often “relevant,”8 
but frequently the most critical evidence against the accused. 
Accordingly, full disclosure should be “dictated by the funda-
mental fairness of granting the accused equal access to his own 
words, no matter how the Government came by them.”9
Although Rule 16(a) was intended to provide more liberal 
discovery in criminal cases,10 its loopholes prevent criminal 
defendants from adequately 
preparing to confront the evi-
dence against them at trial. The 
loopholes may also inadvertently 
provide an incentive for govern-
ment agents to forego written or 
recorded preservation of some 
of the most damaging evidence 
against the accused, thereby 
diminishing its reliability.11 
Finally, nondisclosure may 
entice government witnesses to 
fabricate and embellish from the 
witness stand—free, from any 
concern that their own veracity, 
poor recall, and motives will be exposed to the jury.
Because non-disclosure of a criminal defendant’s own state-
ments is arguably unsupported by any legitimate public policy 
concern, the rationale for Rule 16(a)’s byzantine loopholes is 
difficult to discern. Ultimately, they reflect federal resistance 
to the proposition that discovery in criminal cases advances the 
fair, prompt, and inexpensive administration of justice.12
This Article examines the history of Rule 16(a), its current 
provisions, and the policy considerations for and against modi-
fications to the rule. It then suggests how Rule 16(a) should 
be revised so that it produces the salutary effects of pre-trial 
discovery, without compromising the investigation and pros-
ecution of crimes.
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II. THE HISTORY OF FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(A)
A. THE 1944 ADOPTION: CODIFYING A LIMITED  
 PRACTICE OF DISCLOSURE
In 1944, Rule 16 was adopted against a backdrop of judicial 
concern that discovery in a criminal case might be impermis-
sible,13 and was not mandated by the Constitution.14 Some 
courts, however, allowed the defendant to inspect his or her 
own seized documents and property on the theory that, but for 
the government’s seizure, these items would have been avail-
able to the defendant.15 “The entire matter [was] left within the 
discretion of the court.”16 As originally adopted, Rule 16, titled 
“Discovery and Inspection,” provided:
Upon motion of a defendant at any time after the filing 
of the indictment or information, the court may order 
the attorney for the government to permit the defendant 
to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, 
papers, documents or tangible objects, obtained from 
or belonging to the defendant or obtained from others  
by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the 
items sought may be material to the preparation of his 
defense and that the request is reasonable. The order 
shall specify the time, place and manner of making the 
inspection and of taking the copies or photographs and 
may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.17
There was no requirement that the government provide the 
defendant with his or her own statements in any form.18
B. THE 1966 AMENDMENT: RECOGNIZING  
 A DEFENDANT’S PROPRIETARY INTERESTS
In 1966, Rule 16 was amended to permit, among other 
things, disclosure of a defendant’s own written or recorded 
statements and grand jury testimony.19 The rule did not limit 
disclosure to statements made to a known government agent.20 
It largely left the entire matter to the trial courts’ discretion:
Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the  
attorney for the government to permit the defendant to 
inspect and copy or photograph any relevant (1) written  
or recorded statements or confessions made by the  
defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, 
custody or control of the government, the existence of 
which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence, may 
become known, to the attorney for the government, (2) 
[results of physical and mental exams]; and (3) recorded 
testimony of the defendant before a grand jury.21
The 1966 Amendment followed a wake of criticism regard-
ing the limited discovery allowed in a federal criminal case.22 
Acknowledging that, “[t]he extent to which pretrial discovery 
should be permitted in criminal cases is a complex and contro-
versial issue[,]” the Advisory Committee noted that most of the 
recent legal literature had been “in favor of increasing the range 
of permissible discovery.”23 The Advisory Committee further 
observed that,“[d]iscovery of statements and confessions is in 
line with what the Supreme Court has described as the ‘better 
practice,’ and with the law in a number of states.”24
According to the Committee, “[f]ull judicial exploration 
of the conflicting policy considerations” could be found in 
four New Jersey Supreme Court cases: State v. Tune,25 State 
v. Johnson,26 State v. Murphy,27 and State v. Moffa.28 The New 
Jersey cases are instructive, as they reveal the slow accretion of 
judicial recognition that disclosure of an accused’s own state-
ments is not only fundamentally fair, but does nothing to tip the 
prosecution’s hand or compromise its case.
In 1953, Tune examined whether a trial court judge abused 
his discretion by permitting an accused to examine his own con-
fession.29 In affidavits, the defendant’s attorneys averred that the 
defendant could not recall what he said and claimed his confes-
sion was the product of prolonged questioning, the use of force, 
and threats of violence, rendering the confession involuntary.30 
The trial court authorized disclosure, observing that, “[n]o rea-
sons appear for believing that the prosecutor will be hampered 
in his preparation for the trial or that there will be a failure of 
justice, or that the public interest will be adversely affected, if 
the inspection of defendant’s confession is permitted.”31
In a four to three split, the New Jersey Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that the trial court’s approach placed an unfair 
burden on the prosecution.32 It observed that the accused, rather 
than his attorneys, must provide an affidavit that supported his 
motion which could thereafter be used against him at trial.33 
The majority cited with approval the withering jurisprudence 
of Judge Learned Hand, who described pre-trial discovery as 
an attempt to mollycoddle criminal defendants whose guilt was 
all but certain:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every 
advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the 
charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his 
defense. He is immune from question or comment on 
his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the 
least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. 
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole 
evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and 
make his defense, fairly and foully, I have never been 
able to see. . . . Our dangers do not lie in too little  
tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been always 
haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It 
is an unreal dream. What we need to fear is the archaic 
formulism and the watery sentiment that obstructs,  
delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.34
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The Tune majority begrudgingly recognized that a de-
fendant’s own confession could hardly be regarded as the 
work product of the prosecution.35 It also noted that one state, 
Louisiana, mandated disclosure of an accused’s confession, 
while “many other jurisdictions” allowed disclosure solely as a 
matter of judicial grace.36 Concluding that “[t]o grant a defen-
dant the unqualified right to inspect his confession before trial 
would be to give him an opportunity to procure false testimony 
and to commit perjury at the expense of society[,]”37 and noting 
“long experience has taught the courts that often discovery will 
not lead to honest fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and 
the suppression of evidence,”38 the Tune court concluded that 
the trial court’s disclosure order was an abuse of discretion.39
Not surprisingly, the Tune dissent pointed out that the 
New Jersey courts had virtually no experience, much less 
“long experience,” with discovery in criminal cases, and that 
the same parade of horribles beginning and ending with perjury 
was raised in opposition to civil discovery only to be shown, 
by long experience, to be baseless.40 The dissent decried the 
fundamental unfairness of denying an accused access to his or 
her statements:
It shocks my sense of justice that in these circum-
stances counsel for an accused facing a possible death 
sentence should be denied inspection of his confession 
which, were this a civil case, could not be denied. . . . 
In the ordinary affairs of life we would be startled at 
the suggestion that we should not be entitled as a mat-
ter of course to a copy of something we signed, . . . [h]
ow possibly can we say that counsel for the accused 
should be denied a copy in face of the affirmative find-
ings by [the trial judge], certainly supported by what 
was before him, that neither the public interest nor the 
prosecution of the State’s case will suffer? . . . It is 
said that the accused “better than anyone else knows 
its contents” and that his representation to his counsel 
that he does not is “unbelievable.” Even if that is our 
belief, why are we to say that [the trial court’s] con-
trary conclusion was not reasonably founded? I should 
think it was entirely reasonable for [the trial court] not 
to disbelieve that assertion in face of the circumstances 
under which the confession was taken, the “conversa-
tions” over five hours of the early morning and the fact 
that it is not the accused’s composition but the “narra-
tive” written down by the police officer. . . . To shackle 
counsel so that they cannot effectively seek out the 
truth and afford the accused the representation which 
is not his privilege but his absolute right seriously im-
perils our bedrock presumption of innocence.41
Five years after Tune, in State v. Johnson, a chastened 
New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that Justice William 
Brennan’s dissent in Tune had been echoed by three law review 
articles in their tacit conclusion that Tune had been wrongly 
decided.42 Although purporting to follow Tune, the court 
announced that it would “start with the premise that truth is 
best revealed by a decent opportunity to prepare in advance for 
trial[,]”,43 and that “[i]t is difficult to understand why a defen-
dant should be denied pretrial inspection of his own statement in 
the absence of circumstances affirmatively indicating disservice 
to the public interest.”44
In addition to its departure from Tune, Johnson reflected 
other major evolutions. First, the court acknowledged that the 
accused’s own statements were likely to be the core of the 
state’s case, and “[s]imple justice requires that a defendant be 
permitted to prepare to meet what thus looms as the critical 
element of the case against him.”45 Second, the court conceded 
that it is “no answer to say that a defendant ‘must remember’ 
what he said” because “as every trial lawyer knows, witnesses 
do not recall their statements with precision or detail.”46 Third, 
the court refused to allow the specter of perjury to color its 
decision, noting that “a defendant who will dispute a truthful 
confession hardly needs a preview to aid him.”47 Finally, after a 
criminal defendant makes an initial showing of need, the court 
found the burden of persuasion should shift to the state, which 
must demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” in opposition 
to disclosure.48
C. THE 1974 AMENDMENTS & 1975 ENACTMENT:  
 A SEA CHANGE WITH A TWIST
1974 and 1975 ushered in sweeping changes to the 
discovery process in a criminal case, largely in response to 
the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) comprehensive 
and influential Project on Minimum Standards of Criminal 
Justice.49 The ABA’s House of Delegates’ “Standards Relating 
to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial” served as the bench-
mark for the Advisory Committee’s discussions regarding 
proposed amendments to Rule 16.50
The ABA described its proposals as “revolutionary” and 
proposed “more permissive discovery practices for criminal 
cases than [was] provided by applicable law in any jurisdiction 
in the United States.”51 Noting that its recommendations were 
unanimously approved, the ABA pointed out that “[w]hat united 
the . . . Committee was the view that broad pretrial disclosure of 
the prosecution’s case was the key to satisfying procedural ob-
jectives of overriding significance to criminal justice.”52 These 
procedural objectives, in turn, were defined as the need to “lend 
more finality to criminal dispositions, to speed up and simplify 
the process, and to make more economical use of resources.”53
In the course of its recommendations, the ABA “reap-
praised” traditional grounds for opposing broad discovery and 
concluded as follows:
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One, the advantages to the prosecution of surprise in 
the relatively few cases going to trial, was deemed  
an inappropriate consideration. Another, the fear of 
subversion of law enforcement by perjury, tampering  
with or intimidation of witnesses, or by premature 
disclosure of the identity of informants or details of 
ongoing investigations, was seen as a matter which 
occurred in only a minority of prosecutions and thus 
to be dealt with under the circumstances of particular  
cases, rather than serving as a barrier to discovery in all 
cases. Finally, the argument that some defense counsel  
are untrustworthy was viewed as exaggerated or ana-
chronistic, and in any event as a 
matter more appropriately treated 
as a bar disciplinary problem than as 
a basis for deprivation of the values 
of discovery to the system.54
Accordingly, it proposed almost 
unlimited discovery in a criminal case:
In order to provide adequate infor-
mation for informed pleas, expedite 
trials, minimize surprise, afford 
opportunity for effective cross-
examination, and meet the require-
ments of due process, discovery 
prior to trial should be as full and 
free as possible consistent with 
protection of persons, effective law 
enforcement, the adversary system, 
and national security.55
The ABA recognized that this 
represented a sizable shift from the “grudging” approach to 
disclosure reflected in the federal rules and would require 
“disclosure of nearly everything, subject to certain narrow 
exceptions as to the type of information and to certain safeguards 
as they are needed in a particular case.”56 The ABA, however, 
rejected the notion that the accused’s right to disclosure should 
be conditioned upon his or her disclosures to the prosecution.57
The Advisory Committee and Congress approached the 
expansion of criminal discovery far more gingerly than did the 
ABA, and did so with a decided twist. They accepted many of 
the ABA’s recommendations, including that disclosure should 
be mandatory, not subject to a “good cause” requirement, and 
accomplished by the parties with limited judicial intervention.58 
However, they resisted any broader disclosure obligations 
by the prosecution without a commensurate expansion of 
the defendant’s discovery obligations.59 “The majority of the 
Advisory Committee [was] of the view that the two—prosecu-
tion and defense discovery—are related and that the giving of 
a broader right of discovery to the defense is dependent upon 
giving also a broader right of discovery to the prosecution.”60
Rather than with regard to an accused’s own statements, 
the Advisory Committee and Congress settled upon a series 
of loopholes and exceptions. The job of how to interpret and 
harmonize them was left to the courts.61 Even the ubiquitous 
term “statement” was not defined.62
The Advisory Committee opted for an approach that 
limited disclosure to statements that fell within narrow excep-
tions, rather than the broad policy of disclosure advocated by 
the ABA, even though it acknowledged that the United States 
Supreme Court had observed that pre-trial disclosure of a 
defendant’s statements “may be the bet-
ter practice.”63 Indeed, it limited disclo-
sure in the face of its own recognition of 
the salutary effects of pre-trial discovery:
[D]iscovery contributes to the fair 
and efficient administration of 
criminal justice by providing the 
defendant with enough information 
to make an informed decision as to 
plea; by minimizing the undesir-
able effect of surprise at the trial, 
and by otherwise contributing to an 
accurate determination of the issue 
of guilt or innocence.64
As a result, contrary to a rising tide 
of opinion that broad discovery in crim-
inal cases advanced rather than impeded 
the administration of justice, Rule 16(a) 
became riddled with exceptions with 
regard to disclosure of the defendant’s 
own statements. Without imposing a straightforward quid pro 
quo, it also conditioned broader disclosure by the prosecution 
upon more extensive disclosure by the defendant.65
After the sea change in 1974 and 1975, only two amend-
ments to Rule 16(a) have altered the scope of disclosure of an 
accused’s own statements.
D. THE 1991 & 1994 AMENDMENTS:  
 A SMALL STEP FORWARD
With regard to written or recorded statements of the 
defendant, the 1991 Amendments to Rule 16 eliminated the 
requirement that conditioned disclosure upon the prosecu-
tion’s intention to offer the statement at trial.66 “The change 
recognizes that the defendant has some proprietary interest 
in statements made during interrogation regardless of the prose-
cution’s intent to make any use of the statements.”67 The revised 
rule also required the government to produce, upon the defen-
dant’s request, “that portion of any written record containing the 
The Advisory 
Committee and 
Congress approached 
the expansion of 
criminal discovery far 
more gingerly than did 
the ABA, and did so 
with a decided twist.
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substance of any oral statement” made by the defendant during 
interrogation.68 Finally, the revised rule compelled the prosecution 
to produce any relevant oral statement by the defendant that it 
intends to use at trial, even if only for impeachment.69
Through its broad definition of “defendant,” the 1994 
Amendments clarified that disclosure obligations run to 
and from organizational defendants.70 They also recognized 
that an organization may be bound by its agents’ statements 
and is entitled to the prosecution’s disclosure of all statements 
which the prosecution contends may be attributable to the 
organization’s agents.71
Together, the 1991 and 1994 Amendments reflect the most 
recent revisions to Rule 16(a)’s disclosure obligations insofar 
as they pertain to the defendant’s own statements.
III. EXAMINING FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(A)’S LOOPHOLES
Rule 16(a) imposes upon the government an obligation 
to disclose three types of statements by the accused upon his 
or her request: (1) oral statements made to known government 
agents in response to interrogation; (2) written and recorded 
statements known to the government and in its possession, 
custody, or control; and (3) grand jury testimony.72 All three 
categories require the statements to be “relevant.”73 All three 
categories contain loopholes.74
A. ORAL STATEMENTS MADE TO KNOWN  
 GOVERNMENT AGENTS
Under Rule 16(a), the government must disclose, upon 
the defendant’s request, “the substance of any relevant oral state-
ment made by the defendant, before or after arrest, in response to 
interrogation by a person the defendant knew was a government 
agent if the government intends to use the statement at trial.”75 
Accordingly, the prosecution’s disclosure obligation requires 
the presence of seven “triggers,” each of which presents a cor-
responding loophole.76
First, the defendant must request the statement.77 Second, 
the statement must be “relevant.”78 Third, the defendant must 
make the statement either before or after arrest, and—at least 
arguably—not during.79 Fourth, the defendant must make the 
statement in response to “interrogation.”80 Fifth, a “government 
agent” must initiate the “interrogation.”81 Sixth, the defendant 
must know the government agent is a “government agent.”82 
Finally, the government must intend to use the statement at trial.83
Rule 16(a) does not define the term “government agent.”84 
In the course of drafting this loophole, no explanation was given 
for requiring the statements to be given to a known government 
agent.85 The courts typically define a “government agent” as 
a person employed by or acting on behalf of a federal agency 
after a federal prosecution or investigation has commenced.86 
Rule 16(a) thus arguably exempts from disclosure an accused’s 
statements made to state, municipal, and local law enforcement 
officers.87
Pursuant to the plain language of Rule 16(a), the term 
“government agent” is not limited to those working on behalf 
of the federal government. Moreover, this imputed limitation 
is capable of working a senseless injustice. As the Griggs 
court observed:
We are constrained to note, however, the fundamental 
unfairness which the operation of Rule 16(a)[ ] works 
in this case. If [the defendant] had made his statement 
to a DEA agent or an FBI agent [instead of a Penn-
sylvania state trooper], . . . it would be discoverable 
. . . . [T]his defendant is not entitled under Rule 16 
to discovery material which would be available to 
other defendants in similar situations, with the only 
difference being the employer of the person to whom 
a statement is given. That is, another defendant may 
be arrested in the same manner as [the defendant], be 
charged with the same crime as [the defendant], give 
the same statement in response to the same questions 
during interrogation, and have the arresting agent take 
the same notes, and yet the notes are discoverable in 
one case and not the other.88
Nor does Rule 16(a) define the term “interrogation.”89 
Courts typically define the term in accordance with Rhode 
Island v. Innis90 to refer “not only to express questioning, but 
also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than 
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect[.]”91 Accordingly, the government 
is not required to disclose an accused’s spontaneous oral 
statements, no matter how incriminating.92
Finally, Rule 16 fails to define the term “statement,” leaving 
the “development of a definition to the courts on a case-by-case 
basis.”93 In summary, in addition to grappling with undefined 
terms, a court must find all seven “triggers” present in order 
to find a duty to disclose. As a result, many of an accused’s 
most incriminating statements that are indisputably the product 
of government initiated interrogation are immune from pre-trial 
discovery. In addition, at least one circuit has expressly held 
that the Rule 16(a) requires a written record of a defendant’s 
oral statement made to a known government agent as a further 
precondition to disclosure, even though the appellate court 
acknowledged that Rule 16(a) does not expressly impose this 
requirement.94 Rule 16(a) thus exempts from disclosure a vast 
array of oral statements made by criminal defendants, regardless 
of their evidentiary value to either side.95
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B. DEFENDANT’S WRITTEN OR RECORDED STATEMENTS
Under Rule 16(a), the government must disclose, upon 
the defendant’s request, three categories of written or recorded 
statements by the defendant.96 The first category is “any relevant 
written or recorded statement by the defendant, if: [1] the state-
ment is within the government’s possession, custody, or control; 
and [2] the attorney for the government knows—or through 
due diligence could know—that the statement exists[.]”97 For 
such statements, there is no requirement that the statements be 
intended for use at trial. There is also no requirement that the 
statements be the product of interrogation by a known govern-
ment agent.98 Finally, “[t]he right of a defendant under Rule 16 
to his own recorded statements is presumptive . . . [and] [h]e 
need not show that the statements are material or exculpatory.”99
Rule 16(a)’s second category of disclosure for written or 
recorded statements pertains to that “portion of any written 
record containing the substance of any relevant oral statement 
made before or after arrest if the defendant made the statement 
in response to interrogation by a person the defendant knew was 
a government agent[.]”100 Accordingly, this provision of the rule 
requires: (1) a written record; (2) containing the substance of an 
oral statement; (3) made before or after an arrest; (4) in response 
to interrogation; (5) by a government agent; and (6) whom 
the defendant knew to be a government agent.101 Disclosure 
is further cabined by Rule 16(a)’s overarching relevancy 
requirement.102 By its terms, this provision of Rule 16(a) does not 
require the statements to be known to the attorney for the govern-
ment, or within the government’s possession, custody, or control.103 
The rule also arguably does not require disclosure of statements 
made during arrest, even if they are written or recorded.
The courts are not in agreement as to what types of “written 
records” are covered by the rule.104 Practitioners appear to take 
equally divergent approaches, causing one court to illustrate the 
number of ways the rule is circumvented:
The language of Rule 16 plainly, and unambiguously, 
requires the production of any handwritten notes of 
government agents containing the substance of anything 
said by the defendant during interrogation. Notably, the 
rule requires disclosure of “any written record” contain-
ing “the substance of any relevant oral statement.” It is 
thus not limited to a typed, formalized statement. It is 
not limited to a verbatim or near-verbatim transcription. 
It is not limited to the clearest, most readable version of 
the defendant’s statement. Nor does the rule contain any 
limitations on the nature of the statement (for example, 
that it be exculpatory) or its intended use (for example, 
that the government intends to use it at trial), other than 
the command that it be “relevant.”105
Other courts have required the production of a record 
containing the accused’s statements, but not every record,106 
even where there are minor discrepancies between the agent’s 
handwritten notes and his or her report.107 Still other courts 
have imposed requirements that have no arguable basis under 
Rule 16(a).108
With regard to an accused’s oral and written statements, 
Rule 16(a) provides a labyrinth of triggers and loopholes 
requiring prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts to carefully 
parse whether disclosure is required for reasons that have little 
to do with the use of the statement, its materiality, the ease of 
disclosure, and its facilitation of a fair and just resolution of the 
case. Indeed, Rule 16(a)’s exceptions preserve the potential for 
unfair surprise at trial with no corresponding gain.109
C. DEFENDANT’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY
The final category of recorded or written statements re-
quired to be disclosed is refreshingly straightforward and un-
ambiguous: “the defendant’s recorded testimony before a grand 
jury relating to the charged offense.”110 As defendants who do 
not plan to cooperate with the government rarely testify before 
grand juries, such disclosures are relatively rare. However, in 
the event of cooperation, disclosure of grand jury testimony 
frequently proves useful as it may be used in plea negotiations 
to provide a factual basis for a plea.111 It is also useful at sen-
tencing to determine drug quantities and other disputed factual 
issues and to establish the extent of a defendant’s cooperation 
and substantial assistance to the government.112 Apparently, no 
court has found the burden upon the government imposed by 
this portion of the rule either onerous, unreasonable, or unfair.
Having examined Rule 16(a)’s loopholes, their history and 
derivation, and how the courts have struggled to interpret and 
implement them, this Article next examines whether there is a 
legitimate explanation for their continued existence.
IV. REVISITING DISCLOSURE
A. PRAGMATIC CONSIDERATIONS
The first question to be answered in revisiting Rule 16(a)’s 
loopholes is “Why now?” From a purely pragmatic perspec-
tive, the present is a perfect time for undertaking this effort. The 
federal government’s correctional facilities are overburdened 
and underfunded.113 The judicial branch, like all branches of 
government, is struggling with budget cuts in the face of 
increasing demands for its services. Federal judicial vacancies 
are being filled at a desultory pace, with some districts oper-
ating continuously in crisis mode.114 U.S. Attorney’s Offices 
and Federal Public Defender’s Offices are subject to a hiring 
freeze.115 Despite all of this, crime marches on. Any mechanism 
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that speeds the processing of a criminal case without sacrificing 
the quality of the administration of justice should be explored. 
Here, the courts and commentators are in universal accord 
that pre-trial discovery aids in the prompt and just resolution 
of criminal cases.116 Indeed, over forty years ago, this was the 
primary rationale for the ABA’s advocacy in favor of a policy of 
virtually unlimited pre-trial prosecutorial disclosure.117
When considering the disclosure of an accused’s own state-
ments, the pragmatic advantages of more complete disclosure are 
even more compelling. Criminal defendants who are confronted 
with their statements as potential evidence against them are in a 
much better position to weigh the advantages and disadvantages 
of a negotiated plea and the risks and benefits of going to trial. 
Having seen the strengths of the government’s case against them 
through such expanded pre-trial disclosure, criminal defendants 
might be more likely to engage in more meaningful and timelier 
plea negotiations. It will also better ensure that such negotiations 
are the product of a fully informed decision, thereby reducing 
requests to vacate a plea, claims of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, or efforts to seek post-conviction relief as the result of a late 
discovered discovery violation.
If plea negotiations are not successful, disclosure assists 
in flagging evidentiary issues before trial. The parties will then 
be able to fully brief those issues prior to trial. If an evidentiary 
hearing is required, the court may set it in a timely manner 
without carving into trial time. Disclosure also assists in more 
effective cross-examination. “And probably no one, certainly no 
one experienced in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value of 
cross-examination in exposing falsehood and bringing out the 
truth in the trial of a criminal case.”118 More expansive pre-trial 
disclosure of a defendant’s own statements thus furthers the 
very objectives for which Rule 16(a) was promulgated:
Rule 16’s mandatory discovery provisions were  
designed to contribute to the fair and efficient admin-
istration of justice by providing the defendant with  
sufficient information upon which to base an informed 
plea and litigation strategy; by facilitating the rais-
ing of objections to admissibility prior to trial; by 
minimizing the undesirable effect of surprise at trial;  
and by contributing to the accuracy of the fact-finding 
process.119
Courts that discount these pragmatic considerations often 
grossly understate the disruption that inevitably occurs when 
a prosecutor fails to disclose an accused’s statement pre-trial 
and later uses the statement at trial. At a minimum, the court 
must generally stop the presentation of evidence and hear from 
both sides outside the presence of the jury. The court must 
then ascertain the nature and content of the statement in ques-
tion, the circumstances in which it was made and to whom, its 
materiality, and any prejudice. It must thus analyze the byzan-
tine contours of Rule 16(a) and decide whether, when, and how 
the government should have disclosed it. It must also analyze 
whether there are other grounds for disclosure. In the majority 
 of criminal cases, the Brady doctrine, set forth in Brady v. 
Maryland,120 the Jencks Act,121 Giglio v. United States,122 and Rule 
16 “exhaust the universe of discovery to which the defendant is 
entitled.”123 Thereafter, the court must make the necessary factual 
findings and conclusions of law regarding whether disclosure was 
required and by what rule or law. Properly performed, this is a 
time-consuming and painstaking process.
If the court determines that disclosure was mandated by 
Rule 16(a) or some other requirement of law, the court must 
then decide whether to grant a continuance, declare a mistrial, 
hold a suppression hearing if that is requested, impose sanc-
tions, give a curative instruction,124 or proceed by finding no 
prejudice. Rule 16(a) provides no guidance in determining how 
this analysis should proceed, and further complicates the inquiry 
by failing to define critical terms, leaving such definitions to a 
highly divergent and ever changing body of case law.
When considering the disclosure of an accused’s own statements, 
the pragmatic advantages of more complete disclosure are even more 
compelling. Criminal defendants who are confronted with their 
statements as potential evidence against them are in a much better 
position to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of a negotiated 
plea and the risks and benefits of going to trial.
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Post-conviction, a new trial will be ordered to cure a 
dis covery violation only upon a showing of “substantial 
prejudice.”125 Arguably, Rule 16(a)’s loopholes incentivize 
non-disclosure.
In summary, nonchalant observations that “[s]urprising 
moments and unexpected statements made from the witness 
stand are par for the course in any trial, and even more so in 
a relatively lengthy criminal proceeding,”126 substantially 
understate the disruption caused by untimely disclosures, the 
complexity of the court’s task at trial when the issue arises, and 
the enormity of the prejudice the accused inevitably experiences 
when he or she is confronted, for the first time, with his or 
her own materially incriminating statements. Rule 16(a) is thus 
unnecessarily difficult to interpret, inconsistently and arbitrarily 
implemented, and, if not followed, the ensuing prejudice is 
almost impossible to cure. From a purely pragmatic standpoint, 
this is an opportune time to eliminate its loopholes.
B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
A criminal defendant has a near absolute right “to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”127 In Pointer, the 
United States Supreme Court held “that the right of an accused 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him must be deter-
mined by the same standards whether the right is denied in a 
federal or state proceeding[.]”128 This is pointedly not the case 
with regard to a criminal defendant’s own statements. Many 
states have long required the disclosure of the accused’s own 
statements,129 while federal courts limit disclosure to only those 
statements that make it through the gauntlet of Rule 16(a)’s 
loopholes.130 An equal opportunity for pre-trial discovery in 
state and federal court reflects society’s commitment to afford 
fundamental fairness to criminal defendants regardless of the 
forum in which they are prosecuted.
“Fundamental fairness” also requires heightened procedural 
safeguards when the information in question is “material in the 
sense of a crucial, critical, [or] highly significant factor.”131 It is 
hard to conceive of information that is more “crucial, critical, or 
highly significant” than the accused’s own statements that tend 
to prove that he or she committed the offense charged.132 As the 
United States Supreme Court has observed:
A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, ‘the 
defendant’s own confession is probably the most pro-
bative and damaging evidence that can be admitted 
against him. . . . [T]he admissions of a defendant come 
from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and 
unimpeachable source of information about his past 
conduct.’133
It borders on flippant to justify non-disclosure by asserting 
that the defendant must already know what he or she said,134 
or by permitting disclosure in the nation’s state courts while 
prohibiting it in its federal courts.
Finally, there are few—if any—countervailing public 
policies served by nondisclosure. As the Ninth Circuit observed 
over forty years ago:
When a person is attempting to discover his own state-
ments some of the reasons for not allowing discovery 
are eliminated. There is no danger to government in-
formants; there is no fishing expedition; there is no un-
fairness in giving the defendant the right to discovery 
(a right not available to the government because of the 
Fifth Amendment)[.]135
Broad pre-trial discovery is the rule in civil cases.136 
Fundamental fairness supports equally broad pre-trial discovery 
with regard to a criminal defendant’s own statements. There is 
no rational justification for a contrary approach.137
C. JUDICIAL UNIFORMITY
Rule 16(a)’s loopholes should be eliminated for the 
additional reason that the federal courts have demonstrated a 
marked inability to apply them uniformly. The rule was in-
tended to minimize judicial intervention in pre-trial discovery.138 
The abundance of case law attempting to harmonize the rule’s 
various permutations suggests that this has not been the case.
Almost four decades ago, the Advisory Committee 
explained that “[t]he rule is intended to prescribe the mini-
mum amount of discovery to which the parties are entitled. 
It is not intended to limit the judge’s discretion to order broader 
discovery in appropriate cases.”139 Courts, however, disagree 
regarding the permissible degree of departure from Rule 16(a)’s 
express terms.140
Courts are deemed to have the inherent authority to order 
expanded criminal discovery and to alter the timelines for exist-
ing discovery obligations.141 Rule 16 provides that a court “may, 
for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, 
or grant other appropriate relief.”142
The circuits are divided in determining whether a court 
may order prosecutorial disclosures beyond the confines of 
Rule 16(a). The Third Circuit has held that Rule 16 and various 
federal statutes identify what is discoverable in a criminal case, 
and that a court has no authority to expand disclosure beyond 
them unless the failure to do so would violate Due Process.143 
The Ninth Circuit has taken a similar approach,144 as has the 
Sixth Circuit.145
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has held that a district court 
may take actions which are “reasonably useful to achieve jus-
tice” using its “supervisory powers” to “formulate procedural 
rules not specifically required by the Constitution or Congress 
. . . to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction 
rests on appropriate considerations validly before a jury.”146
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The courts are equally divided on the issue of how to 
address a Rule 16(a) violation once it has occurred.147 The 
options, all undesirable, include taking a recess during the trial 
to hold a hearing on the lack of disclosure,148 prohibiting the 
government’s use of the statement at trial (assuming it has not 
already been revealed to the jury),149 giving a curative instruc-
tion if it has, granting a continuance, declaring a mistrial, or 
doing nothing.150
Appellate review is plagued with a similar selection of 
undesirable choices as appellate courts are forced to speculate 
as to how a trial may have been different if disclosure took 
place in accordance with the rule.151 Rivera,152 is instructive. 
There, the government failed to disclose, until the first day of 
trial, the defendant’s statement to a customs inspector that a 
cocaine-laden suitcase belonged to the defendant.153 Although 
the appellate court recognized the importance of the statement, 
it placed the burden of proof on the defendant, faulted defense 
counsel for failing to anticipate the statement’s existence, and 
found no reason for reversal of the defendant’s conviction.154 
The Eleventh Circuit explained:
In order for this court to reverse a conviction based  
on the government’s violation of a discovery order, a 
defendant must demonstrate that the violation preju-
diced his substantial rights. Substantial prejudice is 
established when the defendant shows that he was 
unduly surprised and did not have an adequate oppor-
tunity to prepare a defense or that the mistake had a 
substantial influence on the jury. After a review of the 
record, we find that Rivera has failed to establish either 
of these requirements.
We do not believe that Rivera could have been  
surprised by [the inspector’s] testimony that Rivera 
had verbally claimed ownership of his suitcase, . . . In 
a trial in which all the issues revolved around whether 
the defendant[] knowingly possessed a cocaine-laden 
suitcase, it is doubtful that Rivera’s counsel would 
not anticipate or contemplate that such a statement 
might exist. In addition, the belated disclosure of [the 
inspector’s] testimony involved Rivera’s own state-
ment which he should have had some knowledge of 
making. More importantly, if Rivera had, in fact, been 
prejudiced by the delayed disclosure of this statement, 
he should have moved for a continuance. Rivera, how-
ever, did not do so and elected to proceed to trial.155
The error thus appeared to lie in the defense’s lack of 
preparation, rather than the prosecution’s lack of disclosure. 
Such an approach renders a disclosure obligation close to 
meaningless, even when it pertains to the most critical evidence 
at trial.
Because of a lack of judicial uniformity, criminal defen-
dants in federal court have disparate rights to crucial pre-trial 
discovery which may have a direct and irremediable impact 
on the outcome of their cases. A simple and expansive rule of 
pre-trial disclosure of an accused’s own statements would 
promote judicial uniformity, ensure all criminal defendants 
in federal court are afforded the same procedural rights, and 
eliminate disparities between state and federal practice which 
have no discernible basis in either logic or public policy.
D. PROSECUTORIAL UNIFORMITY AND INCREASED  
 PROFESSIONALISM
Simple, straightforward, and broad disclosure obligations 
provide an incentive for law enforcement to document evidence 
of a crime, including the often critically important statements 
of an accused. Documentation and preservation of an accused’s 
statements by government agents enhances reliability of those 
statements at trial, making them less dependent upon the 
vagaries of memory, less prone to alteration in the face of 
trial pressures, and better tested through meaningful cross-
examination as the result of pre-trial investigation. No rule of 
criminal procedure should reward lack of documentation as 
a trade-off for surprise at trial. As the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals observed:
The right at stake . . . is defendant’s discovery of  
evidence gathered by the Government, evidence 
whose disclosure to defense counsel would make the 
trial more a “quest for truth” than a “sporting event.” 
This safeguard of a fair trial is surely an important 
one; but here it was undercut at the pretrial period by  
bureaucratic procedures and/or discretionary decisions 
of Government investigative agents who made no  
effort to preserve discoverable material.156
Anything that encourages professionalism and preservation 
of evidence at the investigative stage enhances the likelihood 
that a prosecution that unfolds thereafter will be based upon 
reliable evidence.
In turn, prosecutors who are tasked with a policy of broad 
disclosure of an accused’s statements will gather and produce 
them at a time when they are more likely to be the product of 
accurate recall and less likely to be tainted by bias. Through 
full disclosure, prosecutors also immunize themselves from ac-
cusations of misconduct and potential sanctions and eliminate 
the need for judicial intervention in discovery disputes.157 A 
criminal defendant’s right to discover his or her statements prior 
to trial is thus likely to enhance the evidentiary value of those 
statements while safeguarding the defendant’s right to fully 
confront them at trial.
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E. PROPOSED REVISION TO FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(A)
A revision to Rule 16(a) that requires the prosecution 
to disclose, pre-trial, all statements of the defendant in the 
government’s possession, custody, or control renders both the 
prosecution’s and the court’s task simple. It also provides a 
criminal defendant with the information necessary to engage 
in effective plea negotiations or prepare for trial. As currently 
drafted, Rule 16(a)’s loopholes transform what was intended 
to improve the quality and timeliness of the administration of 
criminal justice into a series of obstacles a defendant must be 
overcome in order to discover his or her own statements. “There 
is something especially repugnant to justice in using rules of 
practice in such a manner as to debar a prisoner from defend-
ing himself, especially when the professed object of the rules 
so used is to provide for his defence.”158 The time to revisit 
Rule 16(a)’s loopholes is now. Rule 16(a)’s loopholes do not 
further any governmental interest that may not be safeguarded 
in a more effective manner. It is time to eliminate them in order 
to achieve a more fair, efficient, and uniform administration 
of justice.
1 U.s. Const. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previous ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”).
2 See, e.g., ariz. r. Crim. P. 15.1 (requiring prosecution to disclose 
defendant’s recorded statements no later than thirty days after arraignment); 
ill. sUP. Ct. r. 412(a)(ii) (ordering prosecution to disclose “any written 
or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by 
the accused” upon defense counsel’s written motion); ky. rCr. 7.24(1)(a) 
(obligating the commonwealth to disclose “the substance, including time, 
date, and place, of any oral incriminating statement . . . to have been made 
by a defendant to any witness” upon his or her written request, as well as to 
permit the defendant to inspect and copy any relevant “written or recorded 
statements or confessions made by the defendant . . . that are known by the 
attorney for the Commonwealth to be in the possession, custody, or control 
of the Commonwealth . . .”); ohio Crim. r. 16(B) (ordering disclosure upon 
written request of “[a]ny written or recorded statement by the defendant . . . 
including police summaries of such statements, and including grand jury 
testimony by . . . the defendant . . .”); r.i, sUPer. r. Crim. 16(a)(1) (requir-
ing state, upon written request, to disclose “all relevant written or recorded 
statements or confessions, signed or unsigned, or written summaries of oral 
statements or confessions made by the defendant, or copies thereof . . .”); 
tenn. r. Crim. P. 16(a) (instructing the state, upon request, to disclose “the 
substance of any of the defendant’s oral statements made before or after 
arrest in response to interrogation by any person the defendant knew was 
a law-enforcement officer if the state intends to offer the statement in evi-
dence at trial,” as well as defendant’s written or recorded statements within 
the state’s control of which the state’s attorney is aware); vt. r. Crim. P. 
16(a)(2)(A) (requiring disclosure of “any written or recorded statements 
and the substance of any oral statements made by the defendant . . .”).
3 See fed. r. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(B); see also United States v. Brown, 345 
F. Supp. 2d 358, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Other than exculpatory evidence, 
the Government is not required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
16 to provide a defendant with advance notice of any statements that it 
intends to offer into evidence, unless the defendant made a request for such 
information.”).
4 fed. r. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(B).
5 Id.
6 fed. r. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(B)(2).
7 Id.
8 See United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1352 n.93 (D.C. Cir. 
1974) (noting “as applied to the accused’s own damaging statements, the 
requirement of relevance ‘seems superfluous in view of the obviously vital 
importance of the material sought.’”); id. (quoting 8 J. moore, federal 
PraCtiCe ¶ 16.05[1], at 16-32 (2d ed. 1965)).
9 Caldwell, 543 F.2d at 1353.
10 fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1974 Amendment 
(“Rule 16 is revised to give greater discovery to both the prosecution 
and the defense. Subdivision (a) deals with disclosure of evidence by the 
government. Subdivision (b) deals with disclosure of evidence by the 
defendant. The majority of the Advisory Committee is of the view that the 
two--prosecution and defense discovery--are related and that the giving of 
a broader right of discovery to the defense is dependent upon giving also a 
broader right of discovery to the prosecution.”).
11 Inevitably, this practice prejudices not only the defense but also the 
prosecution. Any incentive to forego preservation of a witness’s statements 
may ultimately hinder the prosecution’s ability to refresh the witness’s 
recollection, cabin the witness’s statements to those which the government 
can verify and corroborate, and transfer the case to another prosecutor who 
may not have knowledge of unrecorded oral statements allegedly attributed 
to the accused.
12 fed. r. Crim. P. 2 requires all federal criminal procedural rules to be 
“interpreted to provide for the just determination of every criminal pro-
ceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in administration, 
and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.” Id.
13 See United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1932) 
(expressing doubt whether discovery rights in civil cases “could be 
stretched to cover criminal proceedings.”).
14 See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (concluding that 
“[t]here is no constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case . . .”).
15 See United States v. B. Goedde & Co., 40 F. Supp. 523, 534 (E.D. Ill. 
1941) (allowing defendant access to and examination of her own docu-
ments before trial).
16 fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1944 Adoption.
17 New Jersey v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 893 (N.J. 1953).
18 Courts, however, on occasion authorized disclosure of an accused’s own 
grand jury testimony upon a showing of either “compelling circumstances” 
or “particularized need.” United States v. Johnson, 215 F. Supp. 300, 318 
(D. Md. 1963) (ruling that one congressman was not entitled to disclosure 
of his own grand jury testimony because he failed to make the requisite 
showing, whereas other congressman’s “poor physical condition at the 
time he testified [was] supported not only by his own affidavit but by the 
certificate of the attending physician to the Congress,” thus demonstrating 
“a particularized need . . .”).
19 fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1966 Amendment. 
(“The court is authorized to order the attorney for the government to permit 
the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph three different types of 
material: [r]elevant written or recorded statements or confessions made by 
the defendant, or copies thereof” and “[t]he policy which favors pretrial 
disclosure to a defendant of his statements to government agents also 
supports, pretrial disclosure of his testimony before a grand jury.”).
20 fed. r. Crim. P. 16.
14 Spring 2012
21 fed. r. Crim. P. 16 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3).
22 fed. r. Crim. P. 16.
23 See id. (citing eleven articles on the subject).
24 See id. (quoting Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 511 (1958)). The 
Advisory Committee identified the following states as requiring disclosure: 
Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Arizona, California, Louisiana, Michigan, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, and New York.
25 New Jersey v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1953).
26 New Jersey v. Johnson, 145 A.2d 313 (N.J. 1958).
27 New Jersey v. Murphy, 175 A.2d 622 (N.J. 1961).
28 New Jersey v. Moffa, 176 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1961).
29 Tune, 98 A.2d at 887.
30 Id. at 892.
31 Id. at 891.
32 Id.
33 See id. at 892 (noting some courts retain this requirement); see also 
Kreuter v. United States, 376 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir. 1967) (affirming 
denial of defendant’s request for disclosure of all statements he made to 
government agents where affidavit in support of the motion only stated 
defendant was unable to remember his oral statement); United States v. 
Boone, No. 02-CR-1185, 2003 WL 21488021, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 
2003) (concluding that defendant’s discovery request for all statements 
reduced to writing by police and made by him in debriefing session at 
police station prior to Miranda warnings was not supported by defendant’s 
own affidavit and thus must be denied); Cash v. Superior Court of Santa 
Clara Cnty., 346 P.2d 407, 409 (Cal. 1959) (allowing defendant to inspect 
and copy recordings or transcriptions of his statements made to an under-
cover officer upon a showing, supported by affidavit, that court should 
grant the request in the interest of a fair trial); Kreuter v. United States, 376 
F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir. 1967) (affirming denial of defendant’s request for 
disclosure of all statements he made to government agents where affidavit 
in support of the motion only stated defendant was unable to remember his 
oral statement)
34 See New Jersey v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 866 (N.J. 1953) (quoting United 
States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923)). As the Tune majority 
noted, Judge Hand’s elevation to the Second Circuit did nothing to temper 
his views: “The defendants seem to suppose that they had the privilege of 
roaming about at will among any memoranda made by the prosecution in 
preparation for trial: that indeed is not an uncommon illusion, but it has 
nothing whatever to support it.” Id. (quoting United States v. Dilliard, 101 
F.2d 829, 837 (2d Cir. 1938)).
35 Id.
36 See id. at 889 (commenting that the Tune court rejected the defense’s 
invitation to look across the pond for judicial guidance, because although 
England allowed “full discovery in criminal matters,” it relied upon a 
system of private prosecution of crimes, had a far more advanced system 
of crime detection and investigation, and “the law-abiding instincts of the 
[English] population are in marked contrast to the disrespect for the law 
which has long characterized the American frontier and which has not yet 
disappeared as the criminal statistics indicate in certain segments of the 
population.”).
37 Id. at 893.
38 Id. at 884.
39 New Jersey v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 892 (N.J. 1953).
40 Id. at 894 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 896-97.
42 See New Jersey v. Johnson, 145 A.2d 313, 315 (N.J. 1958) (citing 
Decisions, Pre-Trial Discovery of Criminal Defendant’s Confession, 53 
ColUm. l. rev. 1161, 1163 (1953); Criminal Procedure-Discovery of 
Defendant’s Confession, 29 n.y.U. l. rev. 1140, 1141-42 (1954); Recent 
Decisions, Pretrial Inspection of Confession Held Denied Where He Failed 
to Show Justice Required Such Discovery, 39 va. l. rev. 976, 977 (1953)). 
As one commentator observed in reviewing Tune: “If the trial court’s order 
was an abuse of discretion in this case, it is difficult to conjure a fact situa-
tion where a New Jersey judge could, in the exercise of his discretion, allow 
inspection of an accused’s confession.” Id.
43 Johnson, 145 A.2d at 315.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 316.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 New Jersey v. Johnson, 145 A.2d 313, 318 (N.J. 1958).
49 In 1963, the Institute of Judicial Administration at New York University 
Law School proposed to the ABA that it formulate minimum standards 
in the field of criminal justice, building upon a similar project that had 
occurred twenty-five years earlier. In early 1964, the Institute conducted a 
pilot study led by a committee headed by Chief Judge J. Edward Lumbard 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The committee 
authorized a three-year project focused on “the entire spectrum of the 
administration of criminal justice, including the functions performed by 
law enforcement officers, by prosecutors and by defense counsel, and the 
procedures to be followed in the pretrial, trial, sentencing and review 
stages.” aBa ProJeCt on minimUm standards for Criminal JUstiCe, 
standards relating to disCovery and ProCedUre Before trial i, 
at vi (Tentative Draft, 1969) [hereinafter aBa ProJeCt for minimUm 
standards]. Pre-trial discovery and pre-trial procedures were combined in 
a single study because of their interrelation. Id. at vii.
50 fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1974 Amendment.
51 aBa ProJeCt for minimUm standards, supra note 49, at 1.
52 Id. at 1-2.
53 Id. at 2.
54 Id. 2-3.
55 Id. at 34.
56 aBa ProJeCt for minimUm standards, supra note 49, at 40.
57 See id. at 43, 45 (rejecting reciprocal disclosure based on threat of 
“perjury or intimidation of witnesses” or on the notion that the “accused has 
every advantage” due to the government’s burden of proving guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt and the prohibition against inferring guilt from the 
accused’s decision not to testify).
58 fed. r. Crim. P. 16, advisory committee’s note, 1974 Amendment.
59 Id.
60 Id. This Article does not address the constitutionality of requiring 
criminal defendants to provide discovery that may later be used against 
them. It focuses, instead, on the absence of a reasonable justification for 
denying a criminal defendant access to all of his or her allegedly incrimi-
nating statements, regardless of whether they are oral, written, or recorded, 
and regardless of to whom and in what circumstances they were made.
61 The 1975 version of Rule 16(a) as enacted provided:
Upon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant 
to inspect and copy or photograph: any relevant written or recorded state-
ments made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, 
custody or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or 
by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for 
the government; the substance of any oral statement which the government 
intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the defendant whether 
before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person then known 
to the defendant to be a government agent; and recorded testimony of the 
defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. 
No. 94-64, § 3, 89 Stat. 370, 28 (1975).
62 fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1974 Amendment.
63 Id. (citing Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 511 (1958)).
64 Id.
65 As the Advisory Committee explained, the revised rule:
Criminal Law Brief 15
[E]nlarges the right of government discovery in several ways: (1) it gives 
the government the right to discovery of lists of defense witnesses as 
well as physical evidence and the results of examinations and tests; (2) it 
requires disclosure if the defendant has the evidence under his control and 
intends to use it at trial in his case in chief, without the additional burden, 
required by the old rule, of having to show, in behalf of the government, 
that the evidence is material and the request is reasonable; and (3) it gives 
the government the right to discovery without conditioning that right upon 
the existence of a prior request for discovery by the defendant.
fed. r. Crim. P. 16, advisory committee’s note, 1974 Amendment.
66 fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1991 Amendment (“The 
rule now requires the prosecution, upon request, to disclose any written 
record which contains reference to a relevant oral statement by the defen-
dant which in response to an interrogation, without regard to whether the 
prosecution intends to use the statement at trial.”).
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 fed. r. Crim. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, 1994 Amendment 
(“The amendment is intended to clarify that the discovery and disclosure 
requirements of the rule apply equally to individual and organizational 
defendants.”).
71 Id.
72 fed. r. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(A-B).
73 In this context, “relevancy” is typically defined in accordance with fed. 
r. evid. 401 to mean “evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” See 
United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1180 (2d Cir. 1993) (relevance 
is to be interpreted broadly so that the rule gives a “defendant virtually 
an absolute right to his own recorded statements in the absence of highly 
unusual circumstances that would otherwise justify a protective order.”) 
(citing 2 Charles alan Wright, federal PraCtiCe and ProCedUre § 253, 
46-47 (1st ed. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 8 J. 
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2988) (finding no error in admitting into evidence a spontaneous statement 
not made in response to interrogation).
148 See Kusek, 844 F.2d at 947-48 (addressing potential Rule 16(a) 
violation by prosecution by holding an evidentiary hearing outside the 
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